The First Athenian Empire - Abuse of Power
The Disadvantages of Membership to The Delian League
Oct 10, 2009
It is acknowledged in the majority that the Athenians were as surprised as anyone else to discover all the power they seemed to have unwittingly accumulated. With the sudden realisation that they held all the cards in this situation, they, in a manner befitting an empire, embarked on abusing that power. The confederation promoting equality developed into an organisation which, once you had signed up, you couldn’t suddenly change your mind and decide you wanted out. When taken at face value, opting for membership of the anti-Persian alliance, or the modern termed ‘Delian League’, appeared to be a secure investment, but following later revelations, did the unanticipated consequences and catches cast a shadow over the perks which attracted the allies at the League’s creation?
The Revolt of Naxos
Although the benefits from membership of the Confederation were great and the collaborative efforts to quell the Persians and pirates were hugely effective, some states, having seen the Persian menace as being eliminated, not to mention feeling tired from a decade’s worth of crusading against them, tried to withdraw from the alliance. The first were the Naxos islands in c.470 B.C. This request to leave the alliance was seen as a breach of contract as it went against the original Confederate oath forbidding unilateral secession. The Naxians did not retract their wish and therefore had to be subjugated by a siege becoming the first allied state to lose their autonomy as well as being deprived of their navy. This harsh act by the Athenians can be seen as the Naxians receiving their just deserts, having tried to leave a permanent alliance, the terms of which they were perfectly aware at the outset. However, this dictatorial motion taken by Athens, perhaps not foreseeable beforehand, put all other members at a serious disadvantage. Athens’ zero tolerance policy is made clear by Thucydides as he writes how the Athenians “made no allowances” both in their demands and towards “deserters”.
The Revolt of Thasos
The example of the revolt of Naxos was reported as a dispute between the Naxians and the League as a whole. Conversely the subsequent conflict in Thasos in 465 B.C. was of a more personal note, being just between the Thasians and the Athenians. It seems that Athenian greed rose in direct proportion to their power and when the Thasians saw that the Athenians intended to colonise an area of Thrace which the Thasians were they themselves exploiting for its gold, Thasos saw this as a direct threat. Thasos logged a complaint and intended to quit the league. In response, the Athenians attacked the island and besieged the town. Due to exceptional bad timing and a rather large earthquake in Laconia, Thasos received no aid from Sparta and was therefore forced to surrender to Athens. The result of the revolts at Naxos and Thasos was an allied enslavement and a humiliating loss of autonomy. Thucydides writes, “later it happened to the others one by one”. This is the first major example of Athens’ abuse and love of power and the turning point at which the League ceased to be an equal alliance and moved towards an imperialistic empire.
The Growth of Athenian Power
Naxos was not the only allied polis to realise that Persia was no longer really a problem due to the success of the Alliance. It is possible that these states saw the trouble that arose when Naxos tried to break the confederate oath and therefore decided to keep their heads down for the time being. Equally probable is that the benefits of democracy, trade and a united navy suited them well and they had no genuine wish to leave the League. Either way, they saw a large army was no longer necessary and, “because of their reluctance to go on campaign”, switched from paying the Athenians in ships and men, to the equivalent measure in cash. Unfortunately this put them in a place of extreme weakness and also saw them as being responsible for the expansion of Athenian power; with the money received from these poleis Athens increased the size of its own navy as well as fortifying and rebuilding the city. Whilst unwittingly funding the Athenian Empire the allies left themselves “unprepared and incompetent” for the moment when they decided that they did want to revolt against Athens. The states which had observed that the Athenian mission had altered from combined efforts against the Persians to the solo pursuit of enslaving their allies felt incapable of stopping the now enormous power of Athens.
Although some are highly dubious of the idea that Athens’ creation of an empire this powerful was nothing more than purely accidental, most see that the appeals for support in the year 480 B.C. merely presented the Athenians with the opportunity for success previously unconsidered. While the punishments for breaking oath or simply standing up against Athens’ ever encroaching greed were harsh and, mostly, unwarranted, the benefits seem to outweigh the damages but only if a polis is willing to remain timid and never complain. The ‘Athenian Empire’, whether the evolutionary result from a legitimate alliance or an opportunistic and strategically deceptive subjugation, was an undeniably successful organisation of which membership would have been highly rewarding. However, when reading accounts of this empire, be they written by the empire’s supporters or by its detractors, it does seem extraordinary that an empire as successful as the Athenians’ would arise without anyone, especially those in control, seeing it coming.
Sources
Thucydides - History of The Peloponnesian War - The Penguin Group, 1972
Malcolm F. McGregor - The Athenians and Their Empire - University of British Colombia Press, 1987
